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Comments
Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous" from
§ 402A-The Price of Consumer Safety?
I hope that in some way [absolute liability] can be limited to
food, on the theory . . . that food is a special kind of animal
However, when you extend that to cases involving machinery
and appliances and cook stoves, where there are both property
and personal damage . . . . I hope we are not going to get
something in the Restatement that will permit the court to
instruct the jury that all the plaintiff needs to prove is that the
product was defective, and that contributory negligence on his
part is no defense because this is absolute liability.'
A typical plaintiff who has been injured from the use of a "defective" product will bring his action under the alternative theories of
negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, and strict liability. This shotgun approach comes at a time when courts, once
seemingly content with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A's
version of strict tort liability, are groping toward a more consumeroriented standard. One result of this judicial consumerism has been
a change in the plaintiff's initial burden of proof: in some states the
requirement that a plaintiff prove injury from the use of a product
in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," has been pared
down to proof of injury from the use of a "defective" product. Elimination of "unreasonably dangerous," a change at first glance both
innocuous and purely academic, has caused and will cause further
confusion in design defect and failure to warn cases. Without the
"unreasonably dangerous" qualification to provide a standard for
what is "defective," courts explore the thin line between strict and
absolute liability.
In the foreground of this substantive change are the policy bases
for imposition of strict liability. These bases, while giving courts the
freedom to discard the doctrine of caveat emptor, are also reflective
1. 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 80 (1961) (Mr. Alan Loth).
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of a paternalism that may ultimately work to the disadvantage of
the consumer. It is to the problems posed by the elimination of the
"unreasonably dangerous" concept that this comment is addressed.
I.

BACKGROUND TO

A.

§ 402A

Early History

In the mid-eighteen hundreds, a person injured by a product was
without a remedy in either contract or tort unless he could show one
of the following: (a) privity of contract;2 (b) fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of the defendant; 3 or (c) negligence in the manufacture of an "inherently dangerous product."' A wide variety of
objects were soon characterized as "inherently dangerous," 5 until
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' paved the way for negligence liability without proof of privity between manufacturer and remote
vendee. 7 To replace the necessity for showing vertical privity,
MacPhersonproposed two requirements for imposition of tort liability: (1) the nature of the article must be such as to threaten "probable" physical injury to the user if negligently made; and (2) there
must be knowledge that the article will be used without inspection
by persons other than the purchaser. 8 The major factor influencing
the decision was the invitation to public use by the product's presence on the open market; foresight that persons other than the
immediate purchaser would use the product imposed a duty of reasonable care towards them.'
Even after MacPherson had eliminated the vertical privity requirement, the burden of proving defendant's negligence remained.
Sustaining this burden was often impossible since the ordinary consumer is not well versed in manufacturing techniques, and lacks
2. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403-04 (Ex. 1842).
3. Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 866 (Ex. 1837).
4. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
5. E.g., Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909) (coffee urn);
Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (rope supplied to support work scaffold).
6. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (automobile manufacturer found liable to purchaser
of automobile who was injured by the collapse of a wheel manufactured by another).
7. For an analysis of this development, see E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
8-127 (1949).
8. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
9. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 393-94, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916).
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access to defendant's premises and records. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur alleviated this burden somewhat, but it was of no use in a
suit against a wholesaler or retailer. 0 Furthermore, the plaintiff's
assertions could be countered by evidence of defendant's due care,
or of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Of particular public concern at this time were cases involving
injury from adulterated food. To circumvent the burden of showing
negligence, courts began to experiment with fictions that would
impose liability without regard to either privity of contract or fault
of the defendant. These included:" the intermediate dealer as agent
for either consumer or seller; the consumer as assignee of the seller's
warranty to the dealer; the consumer as third party beneficiary of
the contract between seller and dealer; and the article's presence in
the market as creating an implied warranty of fitness for human
consumption. These fictions were ultimately replaced by a concept
of warranty running with the goods similar to a convenant running
with the land. 2 After discarding the requirements of showing privity
and negligence when dealing with adulterated food, the courts proceeded along the same lines when dealing with articles for intimate
bodily use.' 3 Finally, in the 1950's, courts began to extend the implied warranty rationale to impose liability for injury from any product. 4
B.

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.

It was thus in principles that have become primarily associated
with contract and sales law that strict tort liability had its origin.
Yet, the substitution of contract language for that of negligence
brought problems of its own. These problems were both substantive
and procedural, involving notions of reliance, expectations, notice,
15
and disclaimer.
10. See generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as The Assault].
11. These legal fictions are recounted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
[hereinafter cited as § 402A]; id. comment b.
12. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); Caskie v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953).
13. See note 28 infra.
14. The principal case during this time was Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (wife of automobile purchaser allowed to recover from the
manufacturer and dealer for injuries sustained while driving the car).
15. The Assault, supra note 10, at 1127-33.
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Justice Traynor, in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.,"8 attempted to rid the courts of these concepts associated with contract law by placing strict liability solely in tort."
Expanding on the expression of policy in MacPherson,' Traynor's
analysis presumed the manufacturer to be the guarantor of its product'9 safety: 9 not only is there an implied representation of safety
when the defendant invites another to use a product,20 but the plaintiff is at the mercy of the manufacturer and unprepared to meet the
consequences of injury." Underlying this reasoning were two assumptions: (1) the manufacturer can more easily absorb a loss than
can the injured plaintiff; and (2) the imposition of strict liability
will effectively deter production of dangerous products."2
C.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc.

It was not until eighteen years later that the California Supreme
Court's majority decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. ,23 pronounced an independent strict liability in tort, thereby
paving the way for the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. The
Greenman rule, as it has since been labeled,24 was stated by Justice
Traynor:
16. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
17. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 466, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). For more recent appeals that this approach be taken see The
Assault, supra note 10, at 1134; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 833-34 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Strict Tort Liability].
18. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
19. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944):
Judge Cardozo's reasoning [in the MacPherson case] recognized the injured person
as the real party in interest and effectively disposed of the theory that the liability of
the manufacturer incurred by his warranty should apply only to the immediate purchaser. It thus paves the way for a standard of liability that would make the manufacturer guarantee the safety of his product even when there is no negligence.
Id. at 465, 150 P.2d at 442 (Traynor, J., concurring). See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 898 (Pa. 1975) (manufacturer is the guarantor of its product's safety);
but cf. id. at 900 (requiring a finding of defectiveness meant to prevent the manufacturer from
becoming an insurer).
20. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 465, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443.
22. Id. at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
23. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962) (plaintiff, who received a defectively designed power tool as a gift, allowed to recover
from retailer and manufacturer for injuries resulting from its use).
24. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 130, 501 P.2d 1153, 1160, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 440 (1972).
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To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that
plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith
in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in
design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that
made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use. 5
Although the Greenman rule rests on two arguments raised by Justice Traynor in Escola-implied representation of safety and the
manufacturer as a better risk spreader than plaintiffP-it may be
significant in terms of scope of liability that no mention of the
deterrent effect of strict liability was made."
The current version of § 402A was adopted in 1965,25 and until
recently it had been assumed that the Greenman rule and § 402A
were identical."9 But in 1972, the California Supreme Court declared
that the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of § 402A had
never had a place in California's strict product liability." Other
courts followed suit.' In these states, the requirement of proving
25.
Rptr.
26.
27.
28.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
697, 701 (1962).
Id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
See text accompanying note 58 infra.
The 1961 version, captioned "Special Liability of Sellers of Food," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961), was expanded in 1962 to read, "Special
Liability of Sellers of Products for Intimate Bodily Use," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). The 1964 draft, § 402A, supranote 11, adopted by the ALI,

reads:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
29. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 131-32, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161, 104 Cal.

Rptr. 433, 441 (1972). See W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

ToRTs § 98, at 657 (4th ed.

1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
30. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 131-32, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 439 (1972).
31. Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975). See also Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller
Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Alas. 1973) (although the injured plaintiff need not prove
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product defectiveness and proximate causation are arguably the
only elements that prevent the imposition of absolute liability.
II.

CONTRASTING APPROACHES OF COMMERCIAL AND TORT LAW

A.

Differing Policies

A discussion of the importance of the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement is not limited to a consideration of the Greenmanrule32
and § 402A,3 for the warranty background of product liability also
brings into consideration the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
While one of the purposes of § 402A was to circumvent the procedural limitations of sales law34 where physical injuries were treated
as "consequential damages,""5 once both the statutory commercial
rule and the common law tort rule were in existence, they were
construed as representing identical standards. In actions for breach
of implied warranty, the existence of § 402A was first used to justify
elimination of vertical privity, 3 and then of horizontal privity. 37 The
elimination of these privity requirements was then used to buttress
the argument for discarding the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of § 402A. 31 Thus, although the need for a strict liability in tort
initially justified § 402A, the similarity of tort and sales law resulted
in the convergence and dilution of the standards enunciated in
§ 402A and the UCC.
There is, however, a clear need for both contract and tort concepts
to temper the inclination now present towards absolute liability.
Initially, it is important to recognize the different policies underlying § 402A and the UCC, since these differences will ultimately
define the scope of liability which a court will be willing to impose. 9
the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, he must show the existence of
privity of contract to maintain a breach of warranty claim).
32. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
33. See note 28 supra.
34. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) ("[tlhe injured consumer is seldom 'steeped in the "business
practice" which justifies the rule'...." quoting James, ProductsLiability, 34 TEXAS L. REV.
44, 192, 197 (1955)]; Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Titus].
35. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715.
36. E.g., Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
37. E.g., Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
38. E.g., Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
39. See Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4
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In the commercial setting, the concern is for the protection of the
reasonable expectations of the ignorant consumer by preventing
oppression and unfair surprise.4" The UCC comments expressly reject the rationale of "risk allocation" premised on the consumer's
inferior bargaining position.4 The UCC's stated purpose of preventing oppression and unfair surprise involves the consideration of the
quality of the product and the minimum standards to which the
manufacturer is held.
In contrast, § 402A is largely premised on the theory that the
manufacturer who marketed the defective product can treat strict
liability as a cost of doing business.4" This policy of placing the risk
on the one best able to absorb the cost is an economic justification,
dealing only tangentially with the quality of the product. Without
implied standards of consumer expectations to guide product quality, the policy of risk allocation can result in the imposition of liabil43
ity without regard to either fault or defectiveness.
The different expectations which each theory of liability was intended to protect may account for their diverging policy bases.
While the UCC had its origins in commercial transactions where a
consumer might accept the risk of receiving a lower quality product,
§ 402A had its origin in cases involving adulterated foods where a
consumer would not expect to take such a risk.44
B.

Productionand Design Defects

Product liability has gone far beyond the cases of faulty manufacB.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 285, 286-88 (1963) [hereinafter cited as BoshkoffJ; Keeton,
Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L.
REV. 855, 858-59 (1963).
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 4; id. § 2-316, Comment 1. See also
Jones v. Bright, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1169-70 (1829).
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
42. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment c. In 1941, the Commissioners for the Uniform
Sales Act, the precursor of the UCC, experimented with a draft that was similar to § 402A,
and that had much the same policy rationale. REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT § 16-B at 125 (2d
draft 1941). The rejection of this section by the Commissioners indicates not only an awareness of the problems presented by approaching product liability through uniform legislation,
see Titus, supra note 34, at 757; it also indicates the recognition that risk allocation is an
inappropriate theory with which to deal with problems of the marketplace.
43. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 264-69, 509 P.2d 529, 531-33 (1973); see
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (manufacturer held
liable for breach of implied warranty of merchantability for cancer-causing cigarettes).
44. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21
(1965); Boshkoff, supra note 39, at 293-94.
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turing, an area where an absolute liability standard may be justifiably applied.45 However, when a product causes injury because of a
design problem, considerations other than consumer safety must
come into play. The reason for this lies in the distinction between
manufacturing and design "defects."
The result of a manufacturing defect is a flawed product, something other than that intended by the manufacturer. Such a defect
is peculiar to but a few individual products, and can often be remedied by replacing the product with one without flaws. In contrast,
a design choice, whether deliberate or inadvertent, is exactly what
was intended by the manufacturer." The term "defect," since it
implies a deviation from the norm, is inappropriate for design cases
in which the defective design is the norm. 47 Correction of such a
defect involves more than merely replacing it with another product
of the same make. Correction requires cancellation of a model's
production or the complete replacement of one model with another
of a different design. Included in this replacement are additional
costs such as those for redesigning, advertising, and purchasing of
new equipment and different materials, with a strong temptation to
reduce quality of workmanship and materials in order to minimize
48
lost profits.
It is in the design area that the policy basis underlying commercial transactions-protection of the consumer's expectations
through prevention of unfair surprise-must be used to temper the
45. In many cases involving production defects, something approaching an absolute liability has been imposed through application of the negligence principle of res ipsa loquitur.See
Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325, 326 n.5 (1971).
46. Professor Henderson argues that review of a manufacturer's conscious design choice
lies beyond the scope of adjudication. Any attempt to set safety standards in this area would
expose the courts to the confusion that comes in juggling both technological and social tradeoffs. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson]. It has also
been argued that the plaintiff's technological disadvantage makes adjudication of conscious
design choices impractical. Donaher, Piehler, Twerski, Weinstein, The Technological Expert
in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 1303, 1316 n.40 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Donaher]. It would seem, however, that there is a role for consumer input via adjudication
into conscious design choices, if it be only to determine whether, given the dangers posed by
the design, the product should be manufactured and marketed at all.
47. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1968); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 517, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114-15 (1973); see Wade, Strict
Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 832 n.27.
48. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture,52 TEXAS
L. REv. 81, 85-86 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Holford].

1975

Comment

recent inclination of courts towards the adoption of absolute liability premised on risk allocation. If strict liability in tort is not to
become absolute liability, the policy must focus on the consumer's
interaction with the total product, rather than on consumer safety
in a vacuum.
Those courts which do not distinguish between manufacturing
and design defects49 fail to recognize the role of the underlying policies in limiting liability. Risk allocation may be appropriate when
injury is caused by a production defect; but when the question
involves the safety of a product's design, both risk allocation and
consumer expectations must be considered. The word "defect" cannot serve as a substitute for the needed policy considerations. This
is especially true when the only standard for defectiveness is drawn
from "useful precedents."5 By producing an "I know it when I see
it" approach to what is defective,"' this "standard" leads to the
tempting but circuitous argument "if it caused injury, it must be
defective." 2
Product liability involves a censuring of the product rather than
of the manufacturer's actions.5 3 Although the requirement of defectiveness in strict tort liability was meant to replace fault as a means
of limiting a defendant's liability,5" both terms interact; the concept
of fault cannot be abolished without subjecting the manufacturer to
unlimited liability. 5 Implicit in the impugning of the product is a
49. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) ("[a] defect may emerge from the mind of the designer as well as
from the hand of the workman").
50. Id. at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16, quoting Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363,
373 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Traynor].
51. Donaher, supra note 46, at 1306.
52. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 595, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969) (a product
which is defective and causes physical harm is by definition unreasonably dangerous). This
development can be compared to that of the "inherently dangerous product." See text accompanying note 7 supra.
53. Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J.
301, 302 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson, How Good a Product]; Weinstein, Twerski,
Piehler, Donaher, Product Liability: An Interactionof Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REv.
425, 429 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein].
54. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968).
55. See Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 713, 202 N.W.2d 727,
730 (1972).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 14: 25

censuring of its maker.5" But neither product nor producer should
be impugned unless a better product was both technologically feasible and marketable. 7 What is needed is a policy that focuses on
both human safety and the product's place in the market. Neither
§ 402A's "risk allocation" nor the UCC's "commercial expectations" can accomplish this individually. However, both policies
seem to be combined in the context of tort law in the deterrent
theory of strict liability, mentioned by Justice Traynor in Escola. 58
Although the deterrent theory does not answer the question of
whether the product is in fact defective, it does suggest that the
manufacturer should bear the risk because he occupies the better
position of foreseeing and guarding against harm. 5 Inherent in this
rationale is the assurance that liability will not be imposed unless:
(a) a better product was feasible at the time of production, or (b)
the risk is so great that the product, if it cannot be altered, should
not have been marketed at all.
The growth of strict tort liability was influenced by a desire to
circumvent the ideas of privity, notice, and disclaimer associated
with sales law, and to ground strict liability in tort.60 But ironically,
the only term with a tort flavor has been eliminated from § 402A,
leaving a term grounded in contract law to define the scope of liability. 61
56. Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 530 P.2d 53, 60 (Ore. 1974); Dickerson, How Good a
Product, supra note 53, at 302 n.5.
57. See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 21, 484 P.2d 47, 61 (1971) (in determining whether there was negligence in design, the jury must consider "whether others in the
field are using the same design, or a safer design . . . . [and] whether a safer design not
yet in use is known to be feasible"); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 331, 154
N.W.2d 488, 495-96 (1967).
58. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). See text
accompanying note 16 supra.
59. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
60. Boshkoff, supra note 39, at 298; The Assault, supra note 10, at 1134; § 402A, supra
note 11, comment m.
61. The case of Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972),
decided the same day as Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972), replaced the contract term "awareness" which was contained in the
Greenman rule (see text accompanying note 25 supra), with tort language of assumption of
risk. In contrast, the court in Cronin did not even acknowledge the difficulties of limiting
strict tort liability with a contract term. Wade, Chief Justice Traynor and Strict Tort Liability for Products, 2 HoFSTaA L. REv. 455, 464 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Justice
Traynor]. Now, particularly in the area of design problems, the issue has become one of
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C. Breach of Implied Warranty as a Guide to Defectiveness
As shown above, defining "design defect" as a deviation from the
norm is unsatisfactory, since the design is the norm. In an attempt
to delimit "defect," courts are again relying on warranty. And despite protestations that it is "a very different kind of warranty from
those usually found in the sale of goods,""2 the differences are not
readily apparent. 3 Many courts have turned to the UCC which
offers two guidelines: one of implied warranty of merchantability
which sets a minimum standard, i.e., the article must be "fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used"; 4 and one of fitness for a particular purpose, a more subjective standard, i.e., the
article must be fit for its intended use. 5 Some courts and commentators have agreed that "defective" under § 402A is the converse of
"merchantable" under UCC § 2-314.66 But other courts, whether
intentionally or inadvertently, have characterized defective as
'unfit for intended use.''67
defining defect in a way that stops short of absolute liability. For excellent discussions of the
role of "unreasonably dangerous" in this regard, see Comment, Strict Products Liability in
Tort and the Meaning of "Unreasonably Dangerous" Defects, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 343 (1974);
42 FORDHAM L. REV. 943 (1974).
62. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment m.
63. Reliance on theories of warranty has evoked serious discussion regarding the preemption of the UCC over common law § 402A. See Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 265 Ore. 259,
273, 509 P.2d 529, 536 (1973) (O'Connell, C.J., specially concurring); Dickerson, The ABC's
of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV.
439 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson, ABC's]; Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Franklin]; Titus, supra note 34. However, for purposes of this comment,
the UCC and § 402A are presumed to be coextensive and complementary.
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2)(c) (emphasis added).
65. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
66. Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Alas. 1973) (the court
suggests that the defect need not render the product unmerchantable for strict tort liability
to attach); Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 265, 509 P.2d 529, 532 (1973); Dickerson, ABC's, supra note 63, at 443; Franklin, supra note 63, at 980; Murray, Pennsylvania
Products Liability: A Clarificationof the Search for a Clear and UnderstandableRule, 33 U.
PIr. L. REV. 391, 394, 426 (1972); Rapson, Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines:
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS
L. REV. 692, 700 (1965). See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 638
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (unreasonably dangerous standard of § 402A equated with breach of
implied warranty of merchantability).
67. Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533 P.2d 717, 719 (1975);
Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 715, 202 N.W.2d 727, 731 (1972).
This definition is more favorable to the plaintiff than is one that connotes a balancing of risk-
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The importance of which warranty, if either, should be used as a
model for product liability, is best illustrated in the case of Seely v.
White Motor Co." A truck purchased for use in plaintiff's business
of heavy-duty hauling was found to have a condition known as "galloping," a condition which can result in a loss of control during
braking. Eleven months after purchase, and after several unsuccessful repair attempts, the brakes failed and the truck overturned. The
owner-operator was not physically injured. An action was brought
under theories of breach of express warranty and strict liability to
recover (1) repair loss caused by the accident, (2) money advanced
toward the purchase price of the truck, and (3) lost profits caused
by inability to make further use of the truck. 9 The trial court
awarded plaintiff his lost profits and money paid on the purchase
price under breach of express warranty;7" but due to plaintiff's inability to prove that the defect that had caused the galloping was
responsible for the accident, he did not recover the repair expenses. 7'
On appeal, Chief Justice Traynor went out of his way to explain
why the Greenman rule would be inappropriate for recovering repair
expenses even if causation could be proved: warranty is limited to
commercial transactions while strict tort liability is meant to cover
physical injuries.7" Underlying this distinction are notions of the
meaning of "defective," and of the function of the marketplace.7 3
Traynor's analysis assumed that the presence of a defect is synonymous with lack of fitness for intended use. His concern was that
application of strict tort liability to a commercial setting would
impose liability for the product's failure to meet plaintiff's specific
business needs" and economic expectations.7" Liability for failure to
utility. A product may be unmerchantable, or not fit for a particular purpose, and yet still
not be unreasonably dangerous. However, a product that is unreasonably dangerous would
be unfit for use in all cases. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1968).
68. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
69. Id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
70. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 15-16, 403 P.2d at 149-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22. See also Farr v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 93-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 71 (1970); Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 41213, 221 A.2d 320, 335 (1966) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
73. For an excellent discussion of Chief Justice Traynor's opinion for the court in Seely
v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), see Franklin, supra
note 63.
74. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16-17, 403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22
(1965).
75. Id. at 17-18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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meet plaintiff's economic expectations is appropriate when disclaimers are allowed and where expectations are more clearly determined by consensus. But strict tort liability's elimination of disclaimers was meant to prohibit the manufacturer from limiting the
scope of his liability. To impose liability for failure to meet plaintiff's subjective economic expectations while not allowing the defendant an active role in limiting those expectations, could expose the
defendant to unlimited liability."
There is an indication that the more liberal definition of defective
as "unmerchantable" would not have influenced Traynor's distinction. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,7 which the California
court expressly disapproved,"' applied this standard and found for
the plaintiff in strict liability.7" In Santor, the plaintiff bought a
carpet, sold as "Grade #1," which was defective due to faulty manufacturing. The trial court awarded plaintiff the difference between
the purchase price and the actual value of the carpet at the time
he knew of or should have discovered the defect. Although the trial
court's finding was for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, the supreme court found for plaintiff in tort. More importantly,
the court in Santor defined "defect" merely in terms of breach of
implied warranty of merchantability.8 0 No attempt was made to
limit the scope of either "defect" or "merchantable" in the context
of tort law.' Instead, "defect" was left to be defined solely with
82
reference to the open-ended rationale of enterprise liability.
The Santor case perhaps best illustrates that limitation of liability is not a matter of semantics. Without a limiting policy, both
fitness for ordinary use and fitness for intended use are easily
twisted to focus entirely on the plaintiff's economic expectations
rather than on the condition of the product. This is not meant to
76.
39, at
77.
78.

Id. at 16-18, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23. See also Boshkoff, supra note
299.
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17-18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23

(1965).
79. Although Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973) explicitly
rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" standard of § 402A, it is interesting to note that this
standard played no role eight years before in the case of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
80. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66-67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 63-67, 207 A.2d 305, 311-13.
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deny the importance of contract terms in the field of strict tort
liability. 3 Rather, it is meant to illustrate the importance of recognizing that principles from both tort and contract figure into the
concept of product liability.
Greenman was meant primarily as a rejection of the defenses
available under sales law, not as a rejection of its substantive aspects. 4 Accordingly, the statement that the defect render the product "unsafe for its intended use" 5 was added to place the warranty
more firmly in tort. It is clear from the Seely case that Chief Justice
Traynor was reluctant to abandon sales law warranties. Traynor's
objection to Santor was in its imposition of strict liability in the
harm and a condition making the product
absence of both physical
"unsafe for use.""8 In Traynor's view, strict liability in tort is somewhat of a hybrid; to sales law's implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for intended use he added the element of physical
danger. This addition qualifies plaintiff's ability to recover for mere
economic disappointment in the marketplace.
Although Traynor's language of implied warranty of safety reflects the grounding of product liability in contract and tort, it fails
to suggest the balancing process that is peculiar to this area of strict
liability. The standards of fitness for intended use and fitness for
ordinary use, when taken out of the context of sales law and
bargained-for-exchange, become no more than reflections of policy
decisions. 7
83. See generally Franklin, supra note 63, at 986-90.
84. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 20-21
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, Strict Liability].
85. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962) (emphasis added).
86. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23
(1965).
87. See Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 715-17, 202 N.W.2d 727,
731-32 (1972). Compare Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968)
(foreseeability of automobile collision imposes a duty on the manufacturer to design the
automobile so that the user is not subjected to unreasonable harm in the event of a collision),
with Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
836 (1966) (manufacturer's duty does not extend beyond designing an automobile that is safe
for its intended use; collisions are not an intended use).
Adler suggests that an implied warranty of absolute safety be applied where injury occurs
during intended use of the product, and that an implied warranty of reasonable safety be
applied when injury occurs during foreseeable but unintended use. Adler, Strict Products
Liability: The Implied Warranty of Safety, and Negligence With Hindsight, as Tests of
Defect (A Conceptual Framework for the PracticingLawyer), 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 581, 588-92
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III.
A.

CAUSES OF CONFUSION

Problems in Application of the "Unreasonably Dangerous"
Standard

Section 402A reflects the Reporter's awareness of the dual nature
of product liability law as well as the need for a balancing process.
The comments to § 402A define "defect" and "unreasonable danger" in terms of one another; yet they also suggest that both of these
elements must be proved by the plaintiff. Although this may seem
contradictory at first glance, it emphasizes the need for both terms.
Courts that have eliminated the need to prove "unreasonable danger," first to establish plaintiff's prima facie case, and then as a
standard of product defectiveness,8 8 insist that the term sounds too
much in negligence, and that the finding of a defect and proximate
cause is sufficient to prevent the defendant from becoming an insurer.

89

It is suggested here that these courts are more concerned with the
abuses of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard than with the
standard of product safety that it connotes. The "unreasonably dangerous" standard requires a balancing of risk-utility similar to negligence. However, unlike negligence, no inquiry is made directly into
defendant's due care, nor is the plaintiff's contributory negligence
a defense. Foreseeability of harm, gravity of harm, and burden of
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Adler]. However, his application of the test appears inconsistent.
Referring to the Cronin decision, Adler states: "Because the failure was in the function for
which the hasp was intended and designed, the breach was of the warranty of absolute
safety." Id. at 591. The intended use of the "defective" hasp was to prevent the bread trays
from coming into the driver's compartment during ordinary highway driving. The California
court made it clear that the manufacturer must anticipate collisions as a foreseeable aspect
of use, and design the automobile accordingly. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972). Thus, according to Adler's own test,
the defectiveness of the hasp should have been judged by the standard of reasonable safety.
"Intended use," and "anticipated" or "ordinary use" are often used interchangeably. The
result should not depend on which phrase is used, but rather on considerations of what is
reasonably foreseeable use. The doctrine of intended use more nearly allows the manufacturer
to set his own standards of safety, which was what strict liability was intended to prevent.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
701 (1962). In contrast, the doctrine of anticipated use suggests an objective standard imposed
by law. Rogers v. Tor Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
88. E.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 899 (Pa. 1975).
89. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975).
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precaution are inquiries made to determine whether the product
should remain on the market.9" Only indirectly does this involve an
inquiry into plaintiff's or defendant's exercise of due care. However,
some courts, by focusing only on the probability of harm, have
diverted attention from the product as a whole, to either the plaintiff's or the defendant's due care. Obviousness of the danger posed,
one factor in determining unreasonable danger, has been twisted to
resemble the defense of contributory negligence.' Foreseeability of
harm, another factor in determining unreasonable danger, has been
confused with the wholly separate inquiry into proximate cause. 2
1.

Contributory Negligence

Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. 3 was the first case in which the
"unreasonably dangerous" standard was eliminated from product
liability. It is suggested here that this was done out of concern for
the failure of courts to focus on the product and not their injection
of negligence principles. However, because the Cronin court did not
attempt to articulate the meaning of "unreasonable danger" within
the context of product liability, its elimination has been interpreted
as a rejection of all standards associated with negligence. 4
The purpose of strict liability was correctly stated in Cronin as
relieving "the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing
90. See text accompanying note 158 infra.
91. See text accompanying note 93.infra.
92. See text accompanying note 107 infra.
93. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). Plaintiff sustained personal
injuries when the aluminum safety hasp which was designed to hold his bread trays in place
broke upon the collision of plaintiff's truck with another truck. As a result of the safety hasp's
failure, the bread trays came forward, struck plaintiff in the back, and hurled him through
the truck windshield. At the trial, plaintiffs expert testified to the flaws in the aluminum,
alleging the hasp broke "because [the aluminum] was extremely porous and had a significantly lower tolerance to force than a non-flawed aluminum hasp would have had." Id. at
124, 501 P.2d at 1156, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
94. See Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 602, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 899-900 (Pa. 1975).
The defendant in Cronin argued:
[WMithout this element [of unreasonably dangerous] . . .a seller would incur absolute liability for any injury proximately caused by an intended use of a product,
regardless of the insignificance of the risk posed by the defect or the fortuity of the
resulting harm.
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 128, 501 P.2d 1153, 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 438
(1972). Had the court addressed this contention, which posits a defective condition in its
definition of absolute liability, it would have been obliged to clarify the "unreasonably
dangerous" standard.
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negligence and warranty remedies.""5 Section 402A fulfills the
stated purpose since notions of defendant's fault are replaced by
plaintiff's reasonable expectations in relation to the product. 6
However, plaintiff's "reasonable expectations" does ring of the reasonable man standard of negligence, and on this basis "unreasonable danger" was eliminated by the Cronin court. 7
In a design defect case brought in strict tort liability, plaintiff's
burden of proof is satisfied by showing injury during normal use of
the product, provided no secondary causes are evidenced. Defendant must then attempt to show that plaintiff was subjectively
aware of the defective condition, but voluntarily proceeded to encounter it." If defendant could successfully plead that an ordinary
consumer would have expected the defective condition, then this is
tantamount to allowing a defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence in not discovering the defect, or in encountering its dangers.
The Cronin court should have made it clear that defining defectiveness in terms of unreasonable danger and ordinary consumer
expectations need not frustrate the wholly subjective defense of assumption of risk. However, the court itself confused the initial burden of showing defectiveness with the defense of contributory negligence in stating that the "unreasonably dangerous" limitation
has burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element
which rings of negligence. As a result, if, in the view of the trier
of fact, the "ordinary consumer" would have expected the
defective condition of a product, the seller is not strictly liable
regardless of the expectations of the injured plaintiff.
This presumes the existence of a defective condition, but precludes
liability because of the ordinary consumer's expectations. However,
under § 402A the ordinary consumer's expectations are only consid95. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972) (emphasis added).
96. See § 402A, supra note 11, comment i; 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 952 (1974).
97. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972).
98. Luque v. McLean, s Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 44950 (1972).
99. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,132-33, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972). See also Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 602, 304 A.2d 562,
564 (1973).
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ered in establishing the existence of a defective condition in the first
place. Once a defective condition is established, the injured plaintiff's own expectations are considered in relation to the defense of
assumption of risk.'""
2.

Latent-Patent

The Cronin court appears to have been attempting to bring plaintiff's initial burden of proof in line with defendant's defense of assumption of risk. This would eliminate any reference to the latency
or patency of the defect, a test which has been said to bring the
defense of contributory negligence in through the backdoor.'0 '
Liability under the latent-patent test is determined by the manner in which the ordinary consumer would have interacted with a
product were the danger of use obvious. Those courts which have
accepted this test,'"' by allowing the obviousness of the harm to
offset the danger of the product, have focused not on product standards, but on plaintiff's conduct. This is essentially the defense of
contributory negligence. However, the only defenses allowed by
§ 402A are subjective contributory negligence (or assumption of
risk)'03 and product misuse,' 4 and these defenses are not addressed
until the product has been characterized as "unreasonably dangerous."'' 0 Thus, it would seem that the ease with which "reasonable
consumer expectations" can be twisted into the defense of contributory negligence'06 was at the heart of the Cronin court's elimination
of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement.
100. Obviousness of the danger is a consideration to be made in determining assumption
of risk, as well as in determining the reasonableness of the danger posed by the product.
However, in assumption of risk, obviousness of danger is balanced against the plaintiffs age
and experience rather than against the product's other features. See Scott v. Dreis & Krump
Mfg. Co., 26 Ill.
App. 3d 971, 989-91, 326 N.E.2d 74, 87 (1975).
101. Donaher, supra note 46, at 1304.
102. See, e.g., Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971); Bolm v.
Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973). Contra, Dorsey v.
Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("to preclude absurd results the obviousness
of the danger must constitute but one of the factors that determines whether the danger is
unreasonable"), afl'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
103. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment n.
104. Id. comment h.
105. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 843.
106. See Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 497 F.2d 67, 78 (5th Cir. 1974) (court denied plaintiff
recovery for injury when the power winch on a shrimp boat was activated while plaintiff's
hands were entangled in the line, reasoning that such tangling was not beyond the expectation
of experienced seamen); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Dist. Ct. App.
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3.

Proximate Cause

The problem of balancing risk-utility is in the definition and application of terms. Courts which have allowed plaintiff's recovery to
be frustrated by one element of unreasonable danger, such as obviousness of defect, 07 or intended use,'"8 view product design from
the vantage of the injury-producing event rather than from that of
consumer expectations of the total product. In fact, these courts are
often addressing the issue of proximate causation, not that of product defectiveness.0 9 To the extent that the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is a limitation of defendant's liability, it is similar
to proximate cause. However, each is a distinct element that must
be proven by the plaintiff.
The initial determination of product defectiveness must be made
independently of the injury that occurred."' A product should be
characterized as defective if its utility is outweighed by an unreasonably high likelihood of serious harm during anticipated use.
Foreseeability of harm is but one of the elements to be considered
in determining the reasonableness of the danger."' Once it is determined that the product is unreasonably dangerous and therefore
defective, the question is then asked whether the injury resulted
from a danger that was posed by the defective condition-a question
of proximate cause. Foreseeability'll of the injury that occurred is
the sine qua non in the determination of proximate cause."' Often
Fla. 1967) (electrocution while attempting to connect plug of power drill into extension cord
not an unexpected danger).
107. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
108. E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
836 (1966).
109. Hepler v. Ford Motor Co., 27 Ill. App. 3d 508, 327 N.E.2d 101, 108 (1975). See Balido
v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973) ("[a]
danger is unreasonable when it is foreseeable").
110. Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 16, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 585 (1974)
(Compton, J., concurring and dissenting).
111. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333, 154 N.W.2d 488, 497 (1967).
112. Taken here to mean occurring in the natural sequence of events. Prosser, supra note
29, § 98, at 657.
113. But see Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975)
("[floreseeability is not a test of proximate cause; it is a test of negligence").
Leap-frogging from product defectiveness to proximate cause has led to the belief that the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement is superfluous. See 49 WASH. L. REv. 231, 235 (1973)
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the determination of defectiveness and legal causation are difficult
to separate since the injury that actually occurred may be one of the
dangers attendant on the product's use. If this is the case, the approach to the problem of determining defectiveness is "negligence
with hindsight": assuming that the manufacturer knew the danger
of injury that actually occurred, the issue to be decided is (1)
whether this danger was so great in terms of probability and gravity,
that the product was unmarketable, or (2) could the danger have
been reduced without forcing the product outside acceptable limits
of price and utility."'
It is particularly in the area of design defects that separation of
defectiveness and proximate causation becomes complicated. To
establish a production defect, it is often only necessary to compare
the allegedly defective product with others of the same model. If,
because of the flaws in question, the product cannot function as it
will foreseeably be used, then it can be judged defective. In contrast,
design defects are more often unspecified. Since an inference of
defectiveness can arise on proof of injury during normal use of the
product (absent secondary causes)," 5 the defendant is in the position of having to negate the inference by assigning the injury to
other causes. In defending against this res ipsa loquitur type presumption, the defendant is attempting to prove two things: (1) that
no defect existed, and (2) if there were a defect, it was not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Inference of design defect is
difficult to rebut without a constant reference to the injury that gave
rise to the litigation. The problem for the defense is compounded by
the lack of objective standards of design safety which might be used
as a fulcrum for rebuttal."'
Foreseeability of the harm that occurred is a question of proximate cause, and may or may not be considered in determining
whether the design is unreasonably dangerous. Every product presents some danger to its user. The initial question in determining if
the manufacturer has fulfilled its duty to the consuming public is
("while it is easy to conceive of a defective but not unreasonably dangerous product, it is
difficult to imagine that a defect whose risk of harm was so foreseeable that it would be held
the proximate cause of the injury would not also be found 'unreasonably dangerous' ").
114. Adler, supra note 87, at 587-88.
115. Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 407 F.2d 87, 89-90 (3d Cir. 1969).
116. Although failure to comply with federal safety standards is negligence per se, compliance does not establish as a matter of law that the manufacturer exercised due care. Berkebile
v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 484-85, 281 A.2d 707, 710 (1971).
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whether, considering the probability and gravity of foreseeable
harm, the product should have been marketed. If the answer is
affirmative, a second question must be asked: is the danger posed
by the product design acceptable in view of the product's function
and price? Only when this is answered in the negative should a court
address the question of the foreseeability of the harm that occurred.
It must be made clear that the question of defendant's duty in
product design relates to societal needs; its duty to this particular
plaintiff can be no greater than its duty to society.
B. ALI Proceedings
One of the reasons for the confusion surrounding the purpose of
the "unreasonably dangerous" standard can be seen in § 402A, comment i. In 1961, while § 402A applied to food, the decision was made
to use both "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous," as
means of limiting liability. Both elements of proof were retained
without discussion as the section's application was expanded first
to products for intimate bodily use," 7 and then to all products."'
Courts have used Dean Prosser, the Reporter of the Restatement
throughout these three drafts, as authority in their elimination of
the "unreasonably dangerous" standard. Citing one of his articles,
they explain the "unreasonably dangerous" clause as having been
added
to foreclose the possibility that the manufacturer of a product
with inherent possibilities for harm (for example, butter, drugs,
whiskey and automobiles) would become "automatically re9
sponsible for all the harm that such things do in the world.""
The problem here is one of convenient omission, for the clause to
which Prosser was referring in his article was "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous."' 2 Such an omission on the part of the
courts misleads by negating the history of the term "unreasonable
danger."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
118. See note 28 supra.
119. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 441 (1972), quoting Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 84, at 23. See also Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 899 (Pa. 1975); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J.
Super. 599, 602, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973).
120. Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 84, at 23.

117.
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It is interesting to note that disagreement during the 1961 American Law Institute (ALI) Proceedings centered around inclusion of
theword "defect," not "unreasonably dangerous." The discussion
reveals that it was the term "defect" that was added to foreclose
absolute liability. During the discussion, Professor Dickerson moved
to omit "defective," the addition of which he referred to as "gilding
the lily."'' To his mind, liability could be controlled entirely by the
word "unreasonably," since he could think of no product which was
unreasonably dangerous but not defective. 2 ' Prosser's explanation
reveals that these too were his sentiments, but that he saw no problems that could result from the addition of "defective." The term
was added to ensure that a jury's finding an unsafe product to be
unreasonably dangerous would not be sufficient:
[T]here something must be [sic] wrong with the product
itself, and hence the word "defective" was put in ....
"Defective" was put in to head off liability on the part of the
seller of whiskey, on the part of the man who consumes it and
gets delirium tremens, even though the jury might find that all
whiskey is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. 3
Thus, although the word "unreasonably" served to limit liability
for unsafe products, 4 the word "defective" was included to give the
defendant added protection. It may be difficult to imagine an example of a food that causes physical injury which is not at the same
time defective and unreasonably dangerous; but "defective" in this
context means unwholesome and adulterated.'2 5 Once § 402A's application was expanded to include all products, the distinction
between "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" emerged. Unfortunately no examples were given to illustrate this, which may in
part account for the confusion surrounding the purpose of "unreasonable danger."
C.

Comments to § 402A

Section 402A, comment g defines a defective condition as one
"not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unrea121.

38 AL
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123.
124.
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Id. at 87-88.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 830-31.
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sonably dangerous to him.' ' 26 Standing alone, this phrase focuses on
the vulnerability of the consumer and the unexpected nature of the
danger,' 27 both reminiscent of the UCC's concern with oppression
and unfair surprise. Referring as it does to "the ultimate consumer,"
who is invariably the plaintiff, it offers an extremely subjective,
injury-oriented test. Without reference to comment i's definition of
"unreasonable danger," comment g lends itself to the reasoning that
since no injury-causing condition is contemplated (absent assumption of risk), the injury is evidence of product defectiveness. 2 8 If this
is the case, "defect" becomes a descriptive term, "a fiction . . .
[meaning] nothing more than a condition causing physical injury. ''129

While comment g suggests that an article which is defective is
also unreasonably dangerous, 30 comment i suggests that although
the article may be defective, it may not be unreasonably dangerous.' 3' However, comment i cites examples of articles that are unreasonably dangerous only because they are defective. 312 The analysis
126. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment g.
127. Traynor, supra note 50, at 370.
128. In Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Ore. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974), it was unclear
whether plaintiff's complaint was alleging product defectiveness or unreasonable danger:
The obvious inference from these allegations is that the feed was defective and in
damaging the chicks to which it was fed it obviously was not fulfilling the reasonable
expectations of the plaintiffs, because chicken feed is not expected to damage one's
chickens so that their eggs taste bad and they quit laying eggs ....
Id. at 473, 521 P.2d at 538. By positing this injured consumer as a reasonable consumer, the
complaint removed any semblance of objectivity. Where product defectiveness is not specified, the plaintiff asks that inferences be drawn from the fact of the injury itself.
129. Traynor, supra note 50, at 372.
130. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment g provides:
Defective condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is,
at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.
131. Id. comment i provides:
Unreasonablydangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. . . .The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
132. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make
some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful;
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.
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provided in these comments has led courts to conclude that the
purpose of the "unreasonable danger" qualification in limiting liability is adequately served by the requirement of "defect."', 3 It is
suggested here that the examples given in comment i are relevant
to an understanding not only of "unreasonable danger," but also to
the origin of "defect."
Comment i contains examples of products that are unsafe by
nature. It demonstrates two reasons why they are, or are not, unreasonably dangerous. "Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics . . . . ,,3It is not unreasonably dangerous,
not because it is not defective, but because alcohol's effects are
known to the "ordinary consumer who purchases it."'' A product
that is unsafe but not defective is judged by the ordinary consumer's
knowledge of its propensities. If the product is unsafe when put to
use, but its qualities are known to the ordinary consumer, this
knowledge prevents it from being unreasonably unsafe. A warning
is required to prevent a product whose dangers are not commonly
known from being considered unreasonably dangerous. 136 If the required warning is given, comment j implies that the product is not
unreasonably dangerous, and hence not defective.' 37 Consolidating
133. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975).
134. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment i.
135. Id.
136. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment j. The distinction between a direction or
warning under § 402A and a disclaimer under the Uniform Commercial Code, lies in its effect
on the user-consumer. The primary purpose of a warning is to educate the consumer as to
the product's dangers; only in this way can the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe
product avoid liability. Dickerson, How Good a Product,supra note 53, at 310-11. The examples given in § 402A, comment j, are of products to which some people may be allergic, but
which are not defective in the sense of deviation from the norm. The utility of a non-defective,
but unavoidably unsafe product must first be found to outweigh its foreseeable dangers. Only
then will a warning add to the product's safety and justify its marketing. See Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974). A mere warning is not an acceptable substitute for product improvement.
In contrast, the primary purpose of a disclaimer is to shield the manufacturer from liability
no matter what the condition of the product. But see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719
(limitation of liability for physical injuries is prima facie unconscionable). The UniformCommercial Code concerns itself primarily with the form rather than the substance of the
writing, making unnecessary any attempt to educate the user-consumer of the product. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
137. Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container,
as to its use. ...
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comments i and j, products with no assignable defect are judged by
the "unreasonably dangerous" standard which emphasizes consumer knowledge. It is in this area of failure to warn that product
defectiveness and unreasonable danger merge, for unreasonable
danger is the only standard by which to judge defectiveness.
Although comment i suggests that there are defective conditions
which do not render the product unreasonably dangerous, no examples of such products are given. The examples comment i does give
are the same as those used during the 1961 ALI Proceedings where
the decision was made to use "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" in conjunction. "Defect" was added to ensure that the defendant would not be held responsible for products with inherent
possibilities for harm. Comment i makes it clear that whiskey is not
unreasonably dangerous because it is intoxicating; "but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably
dangerous."'' ' In short, "bad whiskey" is unreasonably dangerous
only because it is defective, i.e., there is something wrong with the
product. No examples of a defective product not unreasonably dangerous were given because at the time both terms were included,
they were used with reference to adulterated foodstuffs and flawed
products. Indeed, it is in the area of adulterated food that "defective" is most clearly synonymous with "unreasonably dangerous,"
and in this context "unreasonably dangerous" would be a superfluous term.
IV.

ROLE OF "UNREASONABLY

A.

DANGEROUS" IN DESIGN CONTEXT

Conceptual Problems

"Defect" when applied to products other than food can be any39
thing from a failure to meet specifications to an unsafe design.'
While the term gives the same illusion of certainty as is present
when dealing with adulterated food, it provides no standard of product safety. In fact, defectiveness, as understood by the public to
mean that there is something wrong with the product,'4 0 is to some
... [A] product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is
not in a defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
Section 402A, supra note 11, comment j.
138. Id., comment i.
139. Weinstein, supra note 53, at 430.

140.
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degree a characteristic of all products.' The term when applied to
products other than food is little more than a value-laden description. Some courts have attempted to qualify "defective" with the
word "dangerously."' 42 While this gives defectiveness a tort flavor,
it does not reflect the balancing process needed when considering
design problems, and could result in the characterization of any
injury-producing condition as a defect.4 3 It is suggested that the
term "unreasonable" must provide the standard by which both concepts of danger and defect are measured.'
The function of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is
best illustrated in the trial of a design problem. Here the temptation
is greatest to judge the product solely with reference to its injuryproducing capacity, and to conclude that since the product could
have been designed differently, it is defective.' Although this conclusion may be relevant to the issue of causation, it contributes
nothing to the concept of defectiveness. In the area of design defects,
the product is generically unsafe, but not adulterated; the key
phrase is "unreasonably dangerous." Only if a product is unreasonably dangerous should it be judged defective.'46
141. Weinstein, supra note 53, at 430.
Professor Wade's concern is that the term "defective" will mislead the jury, since it both
implies an absolute standard, and is associated with sales law's loss on a bargain. He suggests
that "harmfully" be added to "defective" to ground the term in tort, and to ensure that a
weighing of factors will be made. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 832.
142. E.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 470-71, 435 P.2d 806, 808 (1967);
Walker v. Coca Cola Bottlers Ass'n, 523 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1975).
143. See Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 595, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969); text
accompanying note 126 supra.
144. Weinstein, supra note 53, at 430-31.
145. The initial decision whether to try a case on the basis of a design or production defect
will affect the type of inquiry into defect, i.e., whether the inquiry will focus on technological
irregularities which have resulted in a product other than that intended, or whether it will
focus on a design which was exactly as intended. For a discussion of the production-design
dichotomy, see Weinstein, supra note 53. The focus of this comment is on the so-called design
defect cases where the concept of defectiveness is obscure and where the censuring of a
product will have the more severe impact on the manufacturer.
Both of these factors-the initial problems of defining defect, and the effect of judging a
product design to be defective-demonstrate the need for the balancing approach of negligence, absent negligence's considerations of defendant's knowledge and due care. See
generally Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 17.
146. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 757-58 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339
(3d Cir. 1973). Compare PROssER supra note 29, § 99, at 659, with West v. Broderick & Bascom
Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972) (production defect case, where "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" are more clearly conducive to establishing separate standards).
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Those courts that have eliminated "unreasonably dangerous" on
the grounds that a bifurcated standard of proof is unnecessary and
burdensome for the plaintiff, have discarded the only element of
§ 402A relevant to design problems. Without "unreasonably dangerous," the courts are left with two alternatives: (1) conclude a
defect existed since a different design would have prevented injury,'47 or (2) conclude there was no defect since the product was
exactly as intended.'48 The "unreasonably dangerous" standard,
on the other hand, suggests an intermediate approach. By focusing
on the consumer's interaction with the product, there is a recogni49
tion "that many products . . . have both utility and danger."'
Under this standard, the issue is whether the utility of the product
outweighs the danger, an inquiry redolent of negligence.'5 °
At this point, it must be made clear that negligence and strict
liability are not "antithetical."' 5 ' If they were, then strict liability
would quickly become absolute liability. Neither Greenman nor
§ 402A was meant to impose liability without regard to defendant's
fault; rather, they were intended to impose liability without regard
to plaintiff's ability to prove that fault.'52 Section 402A was placed
147. This approach was specifically rejected in Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan.
2, 9-10, 20-21, 484 P.2d 47, 53, 61 (1971) (negligent design).
148. This concern was voiced during the ALI discussion concerning omission of the word
"defective." Dean Lockhart was concerned that a manufacturer of a product causing idiosyncratic reactions need only show the product was not defective since it was made as intended.
38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 89 (1961).
As to the capacity of the courts to set design safety standards, see note 46 supra.
149. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968).
150. This balancing process is particularly important in the decision whether or not to
market an "unavoidably unsafe" product. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); § 402A, supra note 11,
comment k.
151. Contra, Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 602, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973).
152. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968):
Where my brethren go astray is in equating the entirely separate concept of strict
liability without fault with strict liability without regard to a product's reasonable
fitness for consumption or use by the general public.
[Lliability is imposed for defective products regardless of whether the defect
could have been discovered by the manufacturer. This is a common use of terminology
to distinguish between the negligence concept of fault as opposed to the implied warranty concept of liability regardless of fault.
Id. at 108-09 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). This dissent was adopted per
curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970). See also Lartigue v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
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in the Restatement section dealing with negligence liability to facilitate comparison with other negligence sections.' 53 It was merely the
defenses of lack of privity, defendant's due care, and plaintiff's contributory negligence that were eliminated with strict liability. 5 , In
other respects, the proof needed for imposition of strict liability
remained similar to that needed for purposes of negligence.' 55
Unlike negligence, the primary focus of product liability is on the
product rather than on notions of plaintiff's or defendant's fault.
However, the product cannot be viewed in isolation. An~y inquiry
into product design must be made with reference to defendant's
design process and plaintiff's own interaction with the product. 56
This implies a balancing process, rather than an absolute standard
of liability. The reasonable seller or consumer provides the standard
against which this balancing is made. 57 So long as one remembers
that it is the product that is being judged, notions of reasonableness
and foreseeability associated with negligence are not antithetical to
strict liability.
B.

Factors to Consider in Evaluating "UnreasonableDanger"

Dean Wade has proposed a set of criteria by which the reasonableness of product danger can be measured. These factors reflect a
realization that all products involve some degree of danger; and that
what is being censured is the manufacturer's failure to strike a
proper balance between design safety and social desire for utility
and aesthetics. They include:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that
153. Section 402A, supra note 11, comment a.
154. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 851 (5th Cir. 1967) ("[tlhe
doctrine of strict liability only removes the requirement of privity of contract; it does not
prove Appellee's case"), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor
Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533 P.2d 717, 719 (1975); § 402A, supra note 11, comment n; note
28 supra.
155. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Ore. 1974); Roach v.
Kononen, 525 F.2d 125, 129 (Ore. 1974); Prosser, Strict Liability, supra note 84, at 50-51.
156. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 437 (1972) (design and manufacture of products must be carried out "with recognition
of the realities of their everyday use").
157. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of
the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 5
Wade then suggests the following jury instructions on the issue of
"unreasonable danger":
A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to
persons [or property] that a reasonable prudent manufacturer
[supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful character
would not place it on the market. It is not necessary to find that
this defendant had knowledge of the harmful character of the
[product] in order to determine that it was not duly safe. 59
These instructions accomplish the purpose of strict liability, i.e., to
relieve plaintiff of proving defendant's negligence, by presuming
defendant's scienter. However, it has been criticized as being overly
defense-oriented and as not putting the focus on the product as it
relates to societal expectations.8 0 Therefore another instruction has
158. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 837-38. These factors are not meant to
be included in the jury instructions, but are to be made by the court in determining whether
the case should be submitted to the jury or decided as a matter of law. Id. at 838-40.
159. Id. at 839-40. See also Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir.
1973); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 851 (5th Cir. 1967); Dorsey v. Yoder
Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aft'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Ore. 1974).
This test of unreasonable danger, presuming knowledge on the part of the defendant of the
dangers that emerged at trial, was originally suggested in Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. Rv.
559, 565-69 (1969). See Holford, supra note 48, at 93-94 (criticizing this test as both furnishing
little incentive for product improvement, and allowing consumers too broad an economic
choice in the area of design safety, a choice which they are not equipped to handle).
160. Donaher, supra note 46, at 1306-07 (commenting on similar instructions given the
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been suggested: "[T]he question is whether the product is a reasonable one given the reality of its use in contemporary society.''6
Either test by itself suffers from vagueness or possible jury misinterpretation. Perhaps the solution is that these tests be combined
in recognition of the interaction of product design, societal
expectations, and reasonableness of seller/manufacturer's actions.
The goal is to have the jury instructions reflect the type of evidence
that was presented during the trial. While the court has the responsibility of focusing the expert testimony on those factors suggested
by Dean Wade,"' the jury should be left to synthesize these considerations in their evaluation of the reasonableness of the danger
posed by the product.
The Cronin court made it clear that it did not intend to make the
manufacturer/seller an insurer of its products.6 3 This, it felt, could
be accomplished by requiring a finding of defect and causation." 4
Although no definition of "defect" was attempted,'6 5 the court must
have assumed an objective standard of reasonableness to which the
defendant would be held. 6 Yet it removed the only requirement
that connotes objectivity, and retained the language associated with
contract law and plaintiff's subjective expectations. What the court
did was to eliminate the term "unreasonably dangerous" because,
as defined in comment i, it could be used to subvert the defense of
assumption of risk. While this is a valid concern, the Cronin apjury in Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 253-54 (5th Cir. 1973)).
161. Donaher, supra note 46, at 1307.
162. In Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1973), the role of
the expert witness is described as providing the jury with the information needed to consider
the factors similar to those listed by Dean Wade (see text accompanying note 158 supra). For
an excellent analysis of the function of the expert, see Donaher, supra note 46.
163. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972). Compare Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 37 (5th Cir.
1963) ("[the manufacturer] is an insurer against foreseeable risks-but not against unknowable risks"), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963), with Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,
337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975) ("the manufacturer is effectively the guaranter [sic] of his
product's safety").
164. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972).
165. The court declared:
We recognize, of course, the difficulties inherent in giving content to the defectiveness
standard. However, as Justice Traynor notes, "there is now a cluster of useful precedents to supersede the confusing decisions based on indiscriminate invocation of sales
and warranty law."
Id. at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16, quoting Traynor, supra note
50, at 373.
166. See Klein v. Continental Emsco Co., 310 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
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proach seems to leave no room for the balancing process suggested
by Dean Wade.
In order to prevent the manufacturer from becoming an insurer,
the court must redefine "defect" so as to restore the objective standard that had been provided by the phrase requiring unreasonable
danger. This raises two problems: (1) such a redefinition of the term
"defect" may confuse the fact-finder; and (2) there may be no attempt to redefine "defect" within the design area. In the context of
a design case, a failure to redefine "defect" would allow the plaintiff
to establish a prima facie case by showing injury during ordinary
use, without specifying the defective condition, and would leave the
defendant with the often difficult task of countering this with the
defense of assumption of risk. Any attempted definition of "defect"
should incorporate notions of safety and risk."6 7 The Cronin court
appears to have precluded this by eliminating the "unreasonably
dangerous" concept, both as a separate standard of proof, and as a
means of defining defect. 6 ' Without the objective standards of danger and risk, the term "defect" offers no guidance in a design defect
case. However, redefining "defect" in terms of tort law's standards
of risk could be confusing since the term is rooted in consumer's
commercial expectations. Viewed particularly within the context of
design problems, the Cronin court's elimination of "unreasonably
dangerous" can be seen as erroneous. Although it was done with the
correct objective, i.e., to focus on the product rather than on the
consumer, it was done without recognizing the two major differences
between production and design cases: there is not a bifurcated standard in the area of design problems, since "defective" means
"unreasonably dangerous";" 9 and product design is more clearly a
function of reasonable consumer (or societal) expectations. 7"
167. Wade, Justice Traynor, supra note 61, at 465 n.48. This negligence approach appears
to be the only means of preventing the manufacturer from becoming an insurer when injury
results from a product design. See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 19-20, 484 P.2d
47, 60-61 (1971).
168. A bifurcated standard is of necessity more difficult to prove than a unitary
one. But merely proclaiming that the phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" requires only a single finding would not purge that phrase of its negligence
complexion.
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442
(1972).
169. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 32 (1973).
170. Donaher, supra note 46, at 1303-09.
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Consumer Expectations

The consumer does not participate in the manufacturer's design
decision except indirectly-through regulations or through the manufacturer's desire to sell his product. "Reasonable consumer expectations" is often distorted by the injury which gave rise to the trial,
since litigation provides the only opportunity for direct consumer
input into design.' However, "reasonable consumer expectations"
relates not only to the issue of how a defect is defined, but also to
the policy considerations underlying strict liability. A discussion of
the role of consumer expectations is meant to illustrate that the
Cronin court was concerned with the abuses occasioned by the application of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard, but that it did
not intend to reject the factors underlying this standard.
The "reasonable consumer's expectations" of how a product
should function is the only standard the manufacturer can use in
designing his product.'72 To this extent consumer expectations are
coextensive with the manufacturer's duty.' Realistically, neither
consumer expectations nor product design focuses solely on product
safety. Some degree of product safety must be sacrificed in order for
the product to compete in the marketplace; but this sacrifice is only
acceptable in the area of foreseeable use"' because it is here that the
trade-offs of safety, utility, and price are made.
The public is not only the ultimate beneficiary of safety regulations; it is also the ultimate cost-bearer. A limit exists as to how
much it is willing to pay for safety at the expense of non-safety
features. The rationale of risk allocation is that industry should
absorb the cost of harm caused by its products. To the extent that
it refers to industry's being competitive in the market, the rationale
is probably accurate. However, it is the consumer who pays, both
in the sense of increased cost and decreased non-safety features, as
well as decreased design and economic choice. Reasonable consumer
expectations relate directly to the amount the public is willing to
absorb and sacrifice for safety.' 5 Once a product has exceeded limi171.

See Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7-8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579

(1974).
172. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 437 (1972).
173. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1075 (4th Cir. 1974).
174. Foreseeable use is defined here to include anything other than intended use, but
short of abnormal use. See note 87 supra.
175. Holford, supra note 48, at 96.
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tations of safety dictated by reasonable consumer expectations, the
product can be labeled "defective." If a consumer chooses to confront that defect, it is he who has "assumed the risk" of harm, and
not the buying public who has assumed it for him.'76 What is needed
is a standard that gives the public a choice of product design while
ensuring that safety considerations are not unduly sacrificed. The
real issue does not concern the amount of product safety that is
needed, but rather the amount of product safety that society is
willing to pay for.'77 Thus, to some extent, the risk allocation model
is misleading since it fails to provide for such an inquiry into society's willingness to bear the ultimate cost. The deterrent rationale, however would compel such an inquiry, for it would be incumbent on the court to ask whether safety could have been achieved
without sacrificing other aspects of socially desirable product de7

sign.1 8
Product design is a function of a number of factors, all relating
to consumer expectations. To discard the term "unreasonably dangerous" because it may be abused is to deny the reality of the design
process. It is suggested here that § 402A's inclusion of "ordinary
consumers' expectations," refers to all aspects of consumer-product
interaction; this includes not only his expectations during use of the
product, but those expectations and considerations that went into
the purchase of the product as well. 79 What is needed is a recognition that concepts of sales and tort law are material to the determination of a design defect. It is irrelevant whether the term used be
"not duly safe,""' or "unreasonably dangerous"'' so long as it reflects the balancing of risks and utility that the dual nature of
design cases requires. The word "defect" is rooted too deeply in sales
law and notions of bargained-for-exchange to reflect these tradeoffs. The very considerations which recommended the term to the
Cronin court, i.e., clarity and simplicity,' make it an unworkable
standard.
176. Id. at 89-90.
177. Henderson, supra note 46, at 1540.
178. Holford, supra note 48, at 85-87.
179. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir. 1974).
180. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 833; § 402A, supra note 11, commentj
(unduly dangerous).
181. Section 402A, supra note 11.
182. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 135, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 443 (1972).
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Conclusion

A balancing of society's safety and commercial needs is particularly desirable in the area of design defects. Unlike the determination of a production defect, where the only alternative to be considered is an "unflawed" product, the design defect case involves consideration of a number of alternative designs. In design cases, the
utility of the product as designed may so outweigh the foreseeable
injury, that its manufacture is justified despite its having caused
injury, and despite technologically feasible alternatives." 3
A case involving automotive design will illustrate this point. In
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,'"' the plaintiff's injuries during a one-car crash were aggravated by the lack of sufficient "crashroom" between the driver's compartment and the front of the vehicle. Although the court acknowledged that collisions are a foreseeable aspect of automobile use,'"5 foreseeability alone was not sufficient to impose liability for harm.' Likelihood of harm, considering
both foreseeability and obviousness of danger, was weighed against
the overall utility and intended use of the product. Design safety,
the court determined, is a function of the inherent limitations of
different models, and of the price at which such models are offered. ' 7 The Volkswagen minibus offered inexpensive transportation for large numbers of people. In the absence of evidence of a
practical design alternative that could offer the same advantages
while decreasing the danger posed, the minibus was unreasonably
dangerous." 8 By speaking of the manufacturer's duty in terms of
safety, utility, and marketability, the court significantly enlarged
the concept of "intended use" to include both practical and aesthetic considerations. This in turn enlarged the scope of judicial
inquiry into consumer interaction with the product.
The flexibility of the course taken by the Dreisonstok court has
attracted those courts that have experienced the frustrations of the
Cronin approach. New Jersey courts seem to be reconsidering the
183. Phillips v. Kirnwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Ore. 1974).
184. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
185. Id. at 1069-70; accord, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d
1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972).
186. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974).
187. Id. at 1072-73. See generally Henderson, supra note 46, at 1540.
188. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1974).
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purpose of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement.',9 Its purpose, it has been learned, was not merely to preclude liability if the
reasonable consumer would have expected the danger; it also connotes an objective standard by which the product can be measured,
while allowing an inquiry into the user's and seller's expectations. 9 "
The California courts are also reviewing product safety standards in
terms of probability and gravity of harm and burden of precaution.'"' These developments reflect the balancing of risk-utility of
the Wade analysis that is absent when the word "defect" is used
alone. However, concurrent with this balancing process, the policy
of enterprise liability' 2 must be revised to include the role of the
reasonable consumer expectations of product design.'
Despite these indications of discontent with Cronin,Pennsylvania
has not only adopted its approach, but appears to have gone one
step beyond.'94 In Berkebile v. Brantly HelicopterCorp. ," the Penn189. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62, 70 (1975)
(used product).
190. Id. at -,
336 A.2d at 70-72.
191. Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1974):
The determination of whether the presence of the water heater in the garage location
constituted a defective design, and the foreseeability of harm resulting therefrom,
should have been left to the jury. It was for the jury to balance the likelihood of harm
and the gravity of the harm as opposed to the burden of precautions which would
effectively have avoided it.
Id. at 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (citations omitted). But see Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc.,
29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973) (accepting Dean Wade's analysis of
strict liability, and characterizing strict liability as similar to negligence, absent the element
of scienter). *
The California courts have also recognized that there must be a standard to use in determining when the lack of warnings renders the product defective. The standard adopted was
that of unreasonable danger:
We do not understand that Cronin . . . overrules the principle . . . [that] a product
although faultlessly made, may be defective, if it is unreasonably dangerous to place
the product in the hands of the user without a suitable warning.
Dosier v. Wilcox & Crittendon Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 80, 119 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (1975).
The manufacturer's failure to warn of dangers in the use of its product is often characterized
as a design defect. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 842. The court insisted,
without explanation, that "[tihe inclusion of the element of 'unreasonably dangerous' when
applied to a duty to warn is entirely different than when applied to a defect in design or
manufacture." Dosier v. Wilcox & Crittendon Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 80 n.3, 119 Cal. Rptr.
135, 138-39 n.3 (1975).
192. This remains the accepted rationale for strict liability in California. See Young v.
Aro Corp., 36 Cal. App. 3d 240, 246, 111 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (1974).
193. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 266, 509 P.2d 529, 532 (1973).
194. The trend of product liability law in Pennsylvania has mirrored that of product
liability generally. In Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966), overruled by Kassab
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sylvania Supreme Court eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous"
qualification of § 402A in accordance with its presumption of the
manufacturer as "guaranter [sic] of his product's safety."'' 8 Considerations of the "reasonable man" standard no longer have a place
in jury instructions;'9 7 and "unreasonable danger" is now a question
of proximate causation' with which it has so often been confused.
Plaintiff's burden is satisfied by a showing of defect and cause in
fact: once these have been established, plaintiff will have shown
proximate cause, since "as to him the product was unreasonably
dangerous."'
One explanation for this oversimplistic view of plaintiff's burden
is the court's failure to appreciate the function of the "unreasonably
dangerous" standard within the context of a design defect case. In
the design area, "defect" is not self-defining,'"' but represents a
v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
plaintiff relief for breach of implied warranty of merchantability when a defective vaporizerhumidifier shot boiling water on him. Relief was denied for want of vertical privity. On the
same day, in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), the same court adopted § 402A.
Although Webb v. Zern, supra, did not purport to overrule Miller v. Preitz, supra, it was an
obvious attempt to circumvent the privity requirement of the UCC. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-318, Comment 3 (beyond protection to family, household, and guests of the purchaser, the Code is neutral).
195. 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975). Decedent was killed in a crash of the helicopter he was
piloting. In a wrongful death and survival action brought against the manufacturer, decedent's executrix claimed the helicopter was defective because: (1) the design allowed the
average pilot insufficient time to go into autorotation in an emergency power failure during
climbing; (2) there were inadequate warnings concerning the risks and limitations of the
autorotation system; (3) the rotor blade which separated during flight was defectively manufactured and designed. There were also allegations of misrepresentations concerning the
safety of the helicopter. Id. at 897.
Any discussion of the Berkebile decision, however, must be made noting that only one
justice concurred in the opinion of Chief Justice Jones; the remaining five justices concurred
in result only.
196. Id. at 898, citing Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903,
907 (1974).
197. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975).
198. Id. at 899.
199. Id. at 900.
200. But see id. at 900. "The salutory purpose of the 'unreasonably dangerous' qualification is to preclude the seller's liability where it cannot be said that the product is defective
..... " Again, this statement reflects a basic misunderstanding of the function of the terms
"defective" and "unreasonably dangerous." See text accompanying note 121 supra. Where
all products of one design are alike defect has no meaning except in relation to the degree of
danger that design poses. The purpose of the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification in the
design area can best be viewed as limiting, rather than precluding, the seller's liability where
the product is not "defective" in the sense of deviation from the norm.
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composite of the factors underlying the "unreasonably dangerous"
standard. Cronin involved a manufacturing defect, where deviation
from the norm could provide the test for defectiveness." °' The
Berkebile decision arose in the context of an alleged design defect
and failure to warn.2 ° Unlike Cronin, Berkebile not only eliminated
the clause "unreasonable danger," but by condemning both "reasonableness 2 °3 and "foreseeability, ' ' 20 4 it has purported to make
impossible a consideration of the factors that enter into the "unreasonably dangerous" evaluation.
The Pennsylvania court made no attempt to define "defect" in
the design context. It did, however, define "defect" in the context
of failure to warn; and in doing so spoke, albeit indirectly, of reasonableness, foreseeability, and plaintiff's expectations. The court
stated the issue as whether there were sufficient warnings accompanying the product to make it safe.2 5 Safe for whom-the "average
pilot," 20 or for the decedent plaintiff? 207 Since the court acknowledged that the degree of protection required was dependent upon
the degree of danger posed,20 the jury's evaluation had to take into
account foreseeability, gravity of harm, and burden of precaution.
The Pennsylvania court and other courts which have adopted the
Cronin approach have two options: either struggle with a definition
of "defect" that must incorporate concepts of risk-utility; or make
the determination of "defect" subordinate to a policy decision
which makes the manufacturer the guarantor of product safety.
Meanwhile, elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard
has posed a difficult dilemma for the trial courts which must apply
the rule.
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